Exelon and Invenergy File FERC Complaints Seeking Capacity Market Changes

Riya Sharma
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Riya Sharma
With over 10 years of experience in professional journalism, this author has covered a broad range of developments affecting businesses, industries, technology, and global markets. Her...
9 Min Read

Two of the Midwest’s most visible energy companies went to federal regulators this week with the same basic message: the way the grid pays for reliability needs to change.

Exelon and Invenergy Transmission each filed a separate complaint at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Exelon is targeting the capacity market run by PJM Interconnection, and Invenergy is targeting the one run by the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO). The two complaints are not connected, but they come from the same worry, that capacity markets are not sending the right signals to the people who build and run power infrastructure.

 

Exelon wants PJM to buy capacity closer to the delivery date

In a Tuesday filing, Exelon asked FERC to order PJM to move to a “prompt” capacity auction. PJM now runs annual base capacity auctions that secure supply three years ahead of time.

Exelon’s proposal would change that schedule starting with the 2030/31 delivery year. PJM would hold its auction about two months before the delivery year begins. If FERC agrees, PJM would still run its next auction in December for the 2029/30 delivery year as planned, and the following auction would take place in early 2030.

Delaying the 2030/31 auction would also give PJM time to overhaul its capacity market. Exelon argues in its complaint that the market no longer works properly.

 

Why Exelon says a prompt auction is better?

Exelon says an auction held closer to delivery would rest on better information. It points to three inputs in particular:

  • more accurate load forecasts
  • better data on which resources will be available
  • more reliable capacity accreditation levels

The Chicago-based utility company also says a prompt auction would give clearer market signals, which would make it easier for resources to enter or leave the market efficiently. Exelon’s utilities serve about 10.7 million customers across PJM’s Mid-Atlantic and Midwest footprint, so the company has a lot riding on how the market is run.

The timeline Exelon is pushing

Exelon asked FERC to rule on the complaint by Jan. 31. That is the last day before PJM is due to publish planning parameters for the 2030/31 base auction, which is currently scheduled for May.

PJM says it is reviewing the filing. Spokesman Jeffrey Shields said the grid operator will respond “at the appropriate time.”

PJM is already working on reform

Shields also pointed to PJM’s own Power Reliability Through Market Design initiative, which is open to stakeholder proposals on how the capacity market could change. More than 30 responses have come in to the request for papers, and they will be discussed at a Nov. 13 workshop.

When PJM launched the effort in May, it outlined three broad reform paths:

  1. stabilizing the existing capacity market
  2. rationing grid reliability among customer classes or regions
  3. moving toward a market built around energy and ancillary services, and away from a capacity market

 

Invenergy says MISO benefits from HVDC lines without paying for them

The second complaint comes from the other side of the Midwest. On Wednesday, Invenergy Transmission told FERC that MISO is wrongly shutting high-voltage, direct-current (HVDC) merchant transmission lines out of its capacity market.

The complaint describes what Invenergy sees as a gap in the rules. MISO counts the capacity value of HVDC lines when it works out how much capacity it needs to buy in its auctions, and that reduces the amount it procures. But MISO’s rules do not let those lines be accredited as capacity resources, and their owners cannot be paid for their capacity value. In Invenergy’s words, that lets the grid operator benefit from the lines for free.

“MISO cannot rely on that capacity, to the benefit of other customers, while refusing to provide any avenue for the entity that provides that capacity to receive commensurate compensation,” the Chicago-based company said.

 

Why the payment question matters for merchant lines?

The business model explains why Invenergy is pressing the point. Regulated transmission owners recover their costs through FERC-approved cost-of-service rates. Merchant line owners do not. They recover costs through rates negotiated with their customers.

That means a merchant line only earns revenue if there is a product or service it can sell. Invenergy argues that without capacity payments from MISO, “there is no product or service that can be the basis of a merchant-based transaction in MISO.” As the company put it, interregional merchant HVDC lines “only receive compensation if there is a product or service — such as capacity — for which they can transact with potential customers.”

 

The Grain Belt Express example

The complaint uses Invenergy’s own Grain Belt Express as the example. Using a “direct loss of load” accreditation method, the line could provide more than 1,800 MW of accredited capacity, according to the filing.

Grain Belt is a 5-GW, 600-kV HVDC project that is planned to run roughly 800 miles from Kansas to Indiana. Invenergy plans to build it in two phases at a total cost of about $11 billion. The first phase would run from southwest Kansas to central Missouri.

 

Why these two filings deserve attention?

On the surface, one complaint is about auction timing and the other about transmission accreditation. Read together, they point to a broader tension. Capacity markets were built to make sure enough power is available when it is needed, but the people who rely on them, from large utilities to merchant developers, increasingly say the rules are out of step with how the grid now works.

The next steps are procedural, and they matter. FERC has to decide whether to act on Exelon’s request by the end of January, and it will also need to consider MISO’s response to Invenergy. PJM’s Nov. 13 workshop will show how much appetite there is for deeper reform before regulators weigh in.

 

Frequently Asked Questions

What did Exelon ask FERC to do?

  • Exelon asked FERC to order PJM to switch from its current forward capacity auction schedule to a “prompt” auction held about two months before the delivery year, starting with 2030/31.

How does PJM run its capacity auctions today?

  • PJM holds annual base capacity auctions that secure power supplies three years in advance.

Why does Exelon want a prompt auction?

  • Exelon says it would use more accurate load forecasts, resource availability data and capacity accreditation levels. It also says it would improve market signals for resources entering and leaving the market.

What is Invenergy’s complaint against MISO about?

  • Invenergy says MISO counts the capacity value of HVDC merchant transmission lines when deciding how much capacity to buy, but does not let those lines be accredited or paid for that capacity.

How much capacity could Grain Belt Express provide?

  • Using a “direct loss of load” accreditation method, Invenergy says the Grain Belt Express could provide more than 1,800 MW of accredited capacity.

When does Exelon want FERC to decide?

  • Exelon asked for a decision by Jan. 31, the last day before PJM is set to release planning parameters for the 2030/31 base auction.
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With over 10 years of experience in professional journalism, this author has covered a broad range of developments affecting businesses, industries, technology, and global markets. Her expertise lies in research-driven reporting and providing readers with relevant context behind important stories.
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